First. break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of our military, the wall that some people will try to build higher.
Second, educate the rest of the military--spread a recognition and understanding of what you do, why you do it. and how important it is that you do it.
Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of our military capability.1
Those three challenges were stated succinctly and simplistically by Admiral Crowe.
But have those challenges been met? Does the US now possess a foundational special operations capability that can meet today's threat?
Further, was Congress successful in legislating an organization for special operations that can meet today's threat across the spectrum of conflict?
Now that the dust has settled after the initial emergence of USSOCOM and two years as a unified command, we can look back and focus on the birth pangs of the command and assess major impacts. In so doing, perhaps there are 
Military Airlift Command (HQ MAC), the Air Force Special
Operations Command (AFSOC) and USSOCOM. Underlying the discussion, the paper asserts that basic differences of interpretation affect assigning forces for combat.
Additionally. the analysis will concentrate on a number of major benefits and shortcomings of the legislation and how these can affect the success or failure of future special operations. Because airlift assets play an instrumental role in Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations, the author will focus on significant airlift issues relative to SOF operations.
Initial discussion centers on perceptions of SOF by -3-
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CHAPTER 1i PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Before immersing into a discussion of the basic SOF legislation, it is important to describe the attitudes and environment within which SOF were working. This will establish the oasic backaround in order to understand why SOF legislation was necessary.
One ot the most disconcerting points about special operations has been the lack of understanding as to who or what is/are special operations. This one point is key to understanding any legislation dealing with it. In the movie "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid." Butch and Sundance were being chased incessantly by a posse of expert lawmen.
They could do nothing to shake them and kept asking the Some would say, these perceptions are merely differences of opinion, but these differences run deeper than that.
... for a variety of reasons. SOF simply do not fit in the conventional military structure. Their operations do not square with the core imperatives of the individual Services and are, in tact, so different that there is little basis for understanding.4
Even though logic and common sense have broken through at times, the past. both prior to and after the Goldwater-Nichols kG-N) DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. has been wrought with misunderstanding and parochial views.
These have had significant impact upon overall SOF ... the only inference to be drawn from the report is that there continue to be elements within the Department of Defense who will resort to almost any ploy... in order to delay, harass. cannalize and frustrate sucessful implementation .... Major Force Program 'Eleven, ' mandated in the law, is conspicuous in its absence. Thus, the one mechanism designed to uncover fiscal deceit and trickery, and to expose it to both you and the Congress, is missing. 10 CHANGING STRATEGY As cited earlier., our national strategy evolved over the years based on what was perceived as the most significant threat to our national security interests.
As the threat changes, so goes the US military force structure.
The basic American philosophical mindset is on a day-to-day basis.
The US focuses on short-term problems and solutions rather than projecting into the future 20 years. In a July The US watched the force structure swing in the late 196Ds and back again in the 1970s.
U.S. Representative Dan
Daniel explains the SOF swing quite clearly.
The "boom" of the early 1960s when SOF, at urging or President Kennedy. were rapidly expanded, was followed by a devastating "bust" in the 1970s. Funding was cut by 95% and a list of SOF units too long to recount was deactivated.
In short, the Services will respond to external pressure to develop a special operations capability it pressed. but would otherwise prefer not to.
Currently, they are responding, generally well. to the Reagan Administration's priority on SOF.
The question is. how long will the current fervor last?12
By the late i970s and early 1980s, the tide had once again, turned in favor of special operations forces. Former
Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, put it this way with respect to the threat:
Since the end of World War 11, ambiguous aggression in the form of low-intensity conflict (LIC) has become an increasing threat to our interests, as well as those of our allies and friends. Although these insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, attempts at subversion, and acts of terrorism do not aperoach the magnitude of the Soviet threat, they represent the principal form of conflict in the world today, and will likely remain so in the forseeable future. 13 In this author's opinion, the key phrase in Carlucci's statement is "the principal form of conflict in the world today...." Consequently, US forces are geared to that threat--at least for now. 
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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the previous discussion, the focus has been on the impact Congressional legislation has had on US special operations capability. This chapter draws conclusions from the material presented and then establishes recommendations for consideration by Congressional and military staffers in similar situations in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
Five conclusions surface for reader consideration:
1.
The Congressional decision to focus attention on SOF by implementing USSOCOM legislation was a positive move.
One of the key purposes of the G-N DOD Reorganization Act was to promote joint action and operation among the US military services. The USSOCOM amendment supported this key purpose.
2.
The DOD reorganization, and specifically the military departments, were forced to place a higher priority on SOF operations and programs. Attitudes that include stifling and stonewalling proposed legislation must be discouraged.
3.
Major commands must lay aside parochial attitudes which exist prior to proposed legislation. This will ensure expertise is rocused on assessing current capabilities and implementing legislated improvements to produce an improved,
.:ver f r-rce psbi ity.
